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MICHAEL LYONS"

Political Self-Interest and U.S.
Environmental Policy
ABSTRACT
This article assembles a theory of political self-interest in U.S.
environmental policy. The article selectively incorporates ideas
from the economic and "public choice" self-interest literature,but
mainly it draws upon the self-interest literature that straddles
tradi
l political science and public choice. Deriing predictions
about the voting public, interest groups, and politicians from this
literature, the article concludes that U.S. officeholders do have
incentive to respond to constituencies favoring environmental
protection, but that the responses will consist predominately of
environmental pork barreling and policy symbolism. The theory has
important implicationsfor environmental interestgroup political
strategy.
Though rich in its diversity, the multidisciplinary environmental
policy literature embraces many paradigms and speaks in many
languages. It often merges empirical and normative approaches seamlessly
and without apology. With the exception of the studies conducted by
economists, it is seldom grounded in positive social science theory, and it
sometimes consists of little more than descriptive case studies.
This article attempts to bring greater coherence to political science
perspectives on U.S. environmental policy. Drawing extensively upon
established scholarship, it assembles components of existing political selfinterest theory into a specific, positive theory of political self-interest in U.S.
environmental policy making.2 The theory predicts that U.S. officeholders
will respond to constituencies favoring environmental protection, but that
the responses will consist predominately of environmental pork barreling
and policy symbolism, with the symbolism designed to placate idealistic
environmental interest groups and a superficially informed public. The

* Associate Professor of Political Science, Utah State University.
1. Throughout the paper "environmental policy" is defined very broadly to include any
program established primarily to develop, manage, or preserve natural resources or the
terrestrial ecology. Traditional, ecologically destructive, natural resource development
programs qualify as "environmental policy" by this definition, though unquestionably many
would consider them to be bad environmental policies.
2. The components of the theory presented here are largely the creations of other
scholars, but the synthesis of components, and the application to environmental issues are,
I believe, substantially original.
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theory has important implications for environmental interest group
political strategy.
In the study of environmental policy, the self-interest approach is
most commonly employed by economists, who focus mainly on the
economic efficiency of policy The closely allied "public choice" literature
has established a formal, theoretical foundation for the study of U.S.
institutions,
but seldom addresses real environmental policy decisions
4
directly.
The theory constructed here incorporates economic and public
choice theories selectively.' Its main objective, however, is to explain the
political logic of current U.S. policy. Thus, it derives many key concepts
and logical arguments from the U.S. institutional literature that straddles

traditional political science and public choice.6 Many of these studies fail to
formalize a self-interest assumption, but all share a general affiliation with
the self-interest approach. Though prominent within political science, this
literature rarely deals explicitly with environmental issues, and it has
received little attention from environmental policy scholars.
The article begins by outlining a simple typology of environmental
policies. It then derives from political self-interest theory predictions about
the broad, public constituency supporting environmental protection and
the narrower interest group constituencies on both sides of environmental
issues. Lastly, the article considers the self-interest of U.S. officeholders in
relation to these constituencies. Although it refers primarily to U.S. national

3. See, e.g., TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS

(1992); BARRY C. FIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1994); ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES L.
SHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); A. Myrick Freeman HI, Economics,
Incentives, andEnvironmental Regulation, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S. REFORM OR
REACnON? (Norman J.Vig &Michael E.Kraft eds., 3rd ed. 1997).
4. See, e.g., KMETH J.ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); JAMES
M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCY, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1971); ANTHONY DowNs,

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); WILLIAM C. MITCHELL &RANDY T. SIMMONS,
BEYOND POLITICS (1994); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNiNG THE COMMONS (1990); WILLIAM H. RIuER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
COALmONS (1%2); James IV.Buchanan, Social Choice Democracy, and FreeMarkets, 22 J.POL

ECON. 114 (1954).
5. See DOWNS, supra note 4; OLSON, supra note 4.
6. For important sources in this category, see generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC
OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS KEY To NE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTAsLISHMENT (1977); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969)

[hereinafter LDwI (1%9)1; GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1966); DAVID . MAYHEW, CONGREss: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); WIIAM OPHULS,
ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARcrt (1977); E. E. SCHATscHNEDER, THE SEMI-SOVEMGN

PEOPLE (1%1); Theodore J.Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political
Theory, 16 WORLD POL, 687 (1964) (hereinafter Lowi (1964)1-Garry J.Miller, FormalTheory and
the Preidency,in RESEARCHING THE PRESIDENCY 289 (George C. Edwards I et al. eds., 1993).
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institutions, the article does address certain consequences of federalism,
and the theory it presents is largely applicable to the context of state and
local policy making. To keep things manageable, the complex subject of
bureaucratic self-interest has been excluded from the analysis.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
Economists and political scientists routinely conceptualize policies
in terms of their cost and benefit distributions! Economists do this
primarily to assess the efficiency of policy, but political scientists most often
do it because they think that policy cost and benefit distributions have
significant political ramifications.9 In particular, political scientists often
find it useful analytically to distinguish between policy costs and benefits
that are specific, and policy costs and benefits that are diffuse. 0 Similarly,
they often distinguish between tangible and intangible policy costs and
benefits."

Environmental policies do not lend themselves readily to classification on the basis of their cost and benefit distributions. Many have multiple
objectives, and even those with narrow objectives usually have complex
consequences. Nevertheless, a crude typology based upon the specificity
and tangibility of policy benefits can serve as a starting point for sorting
out some politically salient characteristics of environmental policies. Such
a typology appears below.' To keep matters relatively simple, and also
because most environmental programs have costs that are both specific and

7. As a result of this exclusion, the theory focuses mainly on the legislative content of
policy-goals, strategies, and broad patterns of resource allocation-rather than the specifics of
policy implementation, which are, of course, determined largely by administrative agencies.
8. Examples of economists conceptualizing policy in terms of cost and benefit
distributions include FIELD supra note 3;TunEN IERG s"qma note 3. Political scientists using this
approach include ARNOLD, supra note 6; MCCONNELL, supranote 6; MAYHEW, supra note 6;
SCHATISCHNEIDER, supranote 6; JAMES Q. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 433-37 (Sth ed.,

1992); Lowi 1964, supranote 6.

9. See id.
10.

See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 8; Lowi (1964), supranote 6.

11. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 18-36.
12. This typology draws upon BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1972); OPHULS,
supra note 6; WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY (1995); W.
Douglas Costain & James P. Lester, The Evolution of Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLIIcs AND POUCY 15 (James P. Lester ed., 1995); John S. Drysek & James P. Lester, Alternate

Views ofthe EnvironmentalProblematicin ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, supra,at 328;
Samuel P. Hays, From Conservationto Envirnmentalism, in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM:
READINGS IN CONSERVATION HISTORY 145 (Roderick Frazier Nash ed., McGraw-Hill, Inc. 3rd

ed. 1990); Arne Naess, The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects, in
ENvIRONMENTAL ETICS: D IENCE AND CONVMGENC 411 (Susan J. Armstrong & Richard
G. Botzler eds., 1993).
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diffuse, as well as both tangible and intangible, policy cost distributions
have not been factored into the typology. Even with this simplification,
however, it must be acknowledged that few environmental programs fit
neatly into just one of the typology categories.
Type I policies are those intended to distribute tangible and specific
benefits. Examples include the stocking of trout in a river, the operation of
a national forest campground, and the preservation of "natural wonders"
for national park visitors. Usually involving natural resource development,
these are environmental policies only by broad definition. When they do
protect the environment, they protect it for a particular use.
Type II policies have the objective of providing relatively tangible
yet highly diffuse benefits. Most of the existing U.S. air and water pollution
control programs fall into this category. So too do programs created to
preserve wetlands wildlife habitat, and programs that strive to maintain
the populations of "significant" endangered species, such as bald eagles.
Lastly, Type M policies are those designed to produce diffuse and
currently intangible benefits. Most forms of natural preservation for
preservation's sake belong in this category. Examples include the designation of wilderness areas for purposes other than visitation, the protection
of "insignificant" endangered species, and "natural regulation" to restore
ecological balance within the national parks.'
Type II and Type IMI policies share a distinguishing characteristic.
Both involve communally shared property-known as common pool
resources or public goods in the lexicon of public choice. 4 The air is one
example of communally shared property, migratory wildlife species such
as tuna, another. Economists generally agree that the free markets fail to
respond efficiently to demand for common pool resources and public
goods, usually resulting in a supply that falls short of what the public
genuinely desires. 5 Consequently, most economists regard governmental
intervention into markets as a necessity in these situations.

13. Advocates of such policy objectives sometimes describe themselves as "deep

ecologists." See Drysek &Lester, supra note 12; MARTIN W. LEMIS, GREEN DELUSIONS (1994);
George Sessions & Bill Devall Deep Ecology, in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: READINGS IN
CONSERVATION HISTORY, supranote 12, at 309.
14. The technical differences between common pool resources and public goods are
unimportant in the present context Some might reject the use of economics terminology such
as "property" or "goods" to describe aspects of environmental quality, but they should have
no quarrel with the notion that whatever these things are, it is the characteristic of being
shared communally that makes them distinctive. See OSTROM, supra note 4, at 11319.
15. See FIELD, supra note 3, at 7841; Tietenberg supra note 3, at 39-42. Worse yet, market
competition can destroy such property, as Garret Hardin vividly demonstrated in The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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A central hypothesis emerging from the theory assembled here is
that the U.S. political system offers to politicians abundant incentive to
provide tangible and specific policy benefits, yet relatively little incentive
to provide benefits that are diffuse or intangible. Thus, the theory predicts
that U.S. government is unlikely to compensate effectively for free market
failures to supply environmental common pool resources or public goods.16
The theory predicts, however, that government will readily supply specific
and tangible environmental benefits that, in economic theory, free markets
could supply more efficiently on their own accord.
II. THE PUBLIC CONSTITFUENCY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Riley E. Dunlap's extensive analysis of public opinion survey
findings indicates that after a waning of interest in environmental
protection in the late 1970s, support rebounded strongly in the 1980s and
the 1990s.17 Dunlap concludes from this data that environmentalism is not
just a passing fad; it has a broad, and apparently durable, base of public
support.'8 Such survey findings must cheer many environmentalists.
Environmentalists have long maintained that the success of the movement
would depend
upon raising public consciousness about environmental
19
problems.
There is little reason to challenge the accuracy of such survey
findings, but there is good reason to question their political significance.'
Though developed primarily in reference to parliamentary systems,
Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy explains why general
public support for a policy goal might not translate into concrete incentives
for policy makers.21 Downs argues that because information is usually not
free and the probability of one vote determining the outcome of an election
in a mass democracy is nearly zero, rational, self-interested people have
little incentive to become informed in order to vote.2 This does not
16. See FIELD, supra note 3, at 78-81; Tietenberg supra note 3, at 39-42.
17. See Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and EnvironmentalPolicy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLmCS AND POLICY, supranote 12, at 63.
18. See id. at 98-105.
19. See, e.g., Dave Foreman, Putting the Earth First, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:
DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE, supra note 12, at 422; Ralph Nader, The Force of Public
Awareness in AMEICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM R&EDINGS NCONSERVATION INIORY, supra note
12, at 227; Nash, supra note 12.
20. In fairness, I must point out that Dunlap himself is fully aware of this skepticism, and
he cautions readers that these survey findings may not have great significance to policy
makers. See Dunlap, supra note 17, at 106-08.
21. DOWNS, supra note 4, at 77-95.
22. See id. at 207-59.
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preclude the possibility that voters might have other incentives to become
informed about politics.' But Downs' theory does imply that most voters
will understand most specific policy issues superficially, at best.
Applying Downs' logic to the contemporary U.S. context, one finds
a variety of institutional circumstances that appear to multiply the "costs"
of being informed as a voter. These circumstances include federalism, the
separation of powers, bicameralism, the congressional committee system,
divided party control of government, and a political party system largely
devoid of discipline. In combination, these circumstances seem likely to
create massive confusion about the policy making process. Because of these
circumstances, it would appear that even when voters are informed about
issues, they would still find it difficult to hold the appropriate officer
holders accountable for their policy decisions.
Thus, despite the broad public support for the concept of environmental protection, one can derive from Downs' theory the prediction that
most U.S. voters will rarely factor anything more than vague impressions
about specific environmental policy decisions into their electoral choices.
Public opinion studies indicate that this prediction is likely to be accurate.
Such studies reveal, for example, that only about one-third of those
surveyed nationally know the name of their U.S. Representative, only
about one-quarter know that U.S. Senators serve six-year terms, that fewer
than ten percent can identify any vote cast on any issue by any of their
congressional representatives, and that over half think the federal
government spends more on foreign aid than on Medicare, overestimating
foreign aid spending by an average of 1300 percent.24 Moreover, despite
President Clinton's outspoken advocacy of environmentalism, and the
sharp contrast between the environmental positions taken by President
Clinton and former President George Bush, only six percent of voters
polled in a 1992 survey cited the environment as the issue that most
influenced their choice of candidate.'
One can also derive from Downs' theory a prediction that to the
extent that environmental issues do matter on election day, voters are more
likely to be aware of Type I environmental policies, with specific and
tangible benefits, than Type H or Type Mn policies. The reason for this is that
the costs of becoming informed are relatively low when benefits are specific
and tangible, but higher when the benefits are diffuse and intangible. For

23. Political science professors, stockbrokers, and government bureaucrats, for example,
have professional incentives to become informed.
24. ROBERT A. BERNSTEIN, ELECTONS, REPRESENrATION, AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTING
BEHAVIOR 16-17 (1989); R. Morin, Tuned Out Turned off, WASHINGTON POST WKLY. EDITION

13:14 (1996), at 6-8.
25. See ROSENBAUM, supranote 12, at 37.

Spring 1999] POLITICAL SELF-INTEREST & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

277

example, the average person can readily appreciate the specific and
tangible benefit provided by the splendor of Yosemite Valley, but
understanding the scientific goals of Type II or Type IMI policies, such as the
protection of "biodiversity," can place unreasonable demands on the
knowledge and attention span of the average citizen. The connections
between such scientific constructs and the consequences for humans are
remote, intricate, and scientifically contestable. Sometimes, it is nearly
impossible even to identify what an "environmental problem" really is.'
Although they do not ground their arguments in Downs' theory,
scholars acknowledge that voter understanding of Type II or Type III
policies is often nebulous.' Also, scholars recognize that public confusion
about these issues dilutes the political importance of the apparent public
support for such policies. Thus, the broad public support for environmental protection may translate only minimally into political incentives to
promote Type II and Type I policy goals.
III. POLITICAL SELF-INTEREST THEORY AND INTEREST
GROUPS
Political scientists universally recognize that because organized
interest groups are far more attentive to policy than the general public, and
also because they possess significant political resources, these groups have
substantial influence over policy outcomes. Indirectly, rational self-interest
theory leads to provocative predictions about: (1) the probable character of
environmental interest group influence, and; (2) the probable balance of
power between environmental interest groups and the resource user and
industrial interest groups that often oppose stringent environmental
protection.
The cornerstone of rational self-interest group theory is Mancur
Olson's The Logic of Collective Action. One central argument of The Logic of
Collective Action is that interest group influence over public policy provides
very little material incentive for rational, self-interested individuals to join
a group.-' Granted, if a prospective member does join a group, then this
adds to the group's resources, enabling the group to exert more influence
over policy. But the new member will capture only a fraction of the
material benefits resulting from this incremental addition to group

26.

See Alston Chase, The Dark Side, 62 RANGE MAG. 4-8 (Summer 1997).

27.

See MICHAE E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENFAL POUCY AND POTICS: TOWARD THE TWENTY-

Fs1r CENTURY 5 (19%).
28. See KRAfr, supra note 27, at 77-78; OPHIULS, supra note 12, at 152-55.
29. See KRAFF, supra note 27, at 77-78; OPHULS, supra note 12, at 152-55.
30. See OLSON, supra note 4, at 9-22.
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influence over policy. Most of the material benefits will go either to other
group members, or to nonmembers who capture benefits as "free riders."
Thus, the individual cost of joining a group will normally exceed the
individual material benefit, and rational, self-interested people will decline
to join. Olson
identifies three exceptions to this
broad generalization.3 1
Legal, economic, or social circumstances that enable a group to compel
prospective members to join create one such exception. For example, union
membership in workplaces regulated by "dosed shop" laws is compulsory.
"Small groups" constitute a second exception to Olson's generalization.32
In such groups, each member accounts for a relatively large proportion of
the group's total resources, and consequently that member receives a
relatively substantial material benefit from his or her contribution to the
group effort. This creates more incentive for prospective members to join
than when a group is larger, and individual payoffs from membership,
lower. Also, individual contributions are more conspicuous in a small
group than in a larger group, facilitating efforts to identify and to
encourage non-member "free riders" to join. A third exception to Olson's
generalization involves situations where groups provide "selective
incentives"--individual benefits offered exclusively to group members. The
discount "Medigap" health insurance and lower hotel rates available to
those who join the American Association of Retired Persons are examples
of such incentives.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS
The broad public support for environmental protection suggests
that environmental groups have tens of millions of prospective members
in the United States. Olson's theory predicts, however, that if these
prospective group members respond rationally to their material selfinterest, then few will join the groups. The exceptional circumstances that
sometimes provide incentive for group membership seldom apply to
environmental groups. First, except perhaps for isolated, local contexts in
which there may be strong social pressures to join environmental groups,
the groups do not compel membership. Second, although narrowly
focused, local environmental groups may sometimes qualify as "small
groups" by Olson's definition, the nationally powerful groups clearly do
not. Third, even though environmental groups commonly do provide
selective incentives for members, such as calendars, magazines, and the
opportunity to participate in group outings, the value of these incentives

31. See id. at 22-52.
32. For Olson's definition of a "small" group, see id. at 22-36.
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rarely approaches the cost of group membership. Selective incentives may
encourage environmental group membership to some degree, but they are
of limited importance to most who join.'
Thus, many environmental interest group members appear to be
motivated by something other than rational responses to material
incentives. Although he does not mention environmental groups explicitly,
participation in such groups falls within a category that Olson characterizes
as "non-rational" or "irrational" or "ideological" behavior.' Terry Moe
identifies a broader array of motivations for such participation in groups,
including altruism, ideals, beliefs about right and wrong, love, status, and
power.' Paul Sabatier explains this type of group membership in terms of
"commitment theory," which predicts that joiners will be motivated by
strongly held ideological beliefs.'
One can extract two predictions about environmental group
members from this body of theory. First, group members are likely to be
intensely ideological. They are unlikely to be representative of the broader
public constituency favoring environmental protection. Second, because
they have joined groups when a rational calculation of material costs and
benefits indicates that they should not, group members probably do not
think routinely in terms of rational self-interest. They may see the world
through a different lens. Perhaps ideals or feelings matter more to them
than costs or benefits.
Substantial literature indicates that both of these predictions have
at least some essential validity. Tracing the fall and rise of environmental
group membership over two decades, Helen Ingram, David Colnic, and
Dean Mann find that people join the groups because they perceive that the
environment is threatened and the groups offer the "appeal of an ideology."' Other scholars have reached similar conclusions. Walter
Rosenbaum characterizes environmental groups as ideological and
sometimes dogmatic.' For example, he describes the groups' insistence on
the strictest possible Superfund standards a "flagrant" example of
inflexibility that reduces the effectiveness of policy.-' He observes that
environmental groups have "vigorously promoted" public participation
requirements in policy implementation, creating a forum for testimony by

33. Helen M. Ingram et al., Interest Groups and Environmental Policy in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLmcs AND POLICY, supranote 12, at 121-22.
34. See OLSON, supranote 4, at 161-62.
35. See TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 113-18 (1980).
36. See Paul Sabatier, Interest Group Member and Organization:Multiple Theories, in THE
POLmcs OF INERESTS 99,109-26 (Mark P. Petracca ed., 1992).
37. See Ingram et al., supra note 33, at 121-22.
38. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 12, at 33-34.
39. See id. at 32.
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group members, but that the policy consequences of such requirements
have been "mixed."' Rosenbaum also notes that environmental leaders
risk their credibility because they "resort to the rhetoric of crisis so
habitually that the mother tongue of environmentalism may seem inspired
solely by the Apocalypse.""'
Robert Hahn maintains that most environmental groups have
strenuously resisted the consideration of costs and benefits in policy."
Instead, he concludes that the groups seem to believe in environmental
protection at any cost, with little regard for the possibility that efficient
policies might enable government to attain goals more effectively. He also
thinks that the groups have little interest in "balanced assessment of the
science underlying policy."'
Steven Kelman found environmental lobbyists to be highly
idealistic." His survey indicated that environmental lobbyists were
knowledgeable about the efficiency arguments in favor of pollution taxes,
yet usually against the taxes on moral grounds.' Bruce Ackerman and
William Hassler reached similar conclusions about environmental
lobbying." They contend that the unrealistic expectations of the Sierra Club
and Natural Resources Defense Council contributed to approval in 1977 of
coal fired power plant regulations that dictated billions in expenditures for
negligible reductions in emissions.Y
Yellowstone National Park scholar Alston Chase portrays
environmentalists as scientifically confused zealots who share an almost
religious commitment to their causes, yet who often disagree philosophically and, as a result, work at cross purposes." Former national park
director James Ridenour echoes Chase's sentiments.49 He found even the
mainstream Sierra Club sometimes to be unreasonable, and he viewed the
efforts of other groups to be almost invariably counterproductive.'
Lastly, professed environmentalist Martin Lewis observes that the
influential, "new" environmental groups such as Earth First! are often

40. See Walter A. Rosenbaum,

The Bureaucracy and Environmental Policy, in

ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIncs AND POuCY, suPra note 12, at 228-29.
41. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 12, at 31.

42. See Robert W. Hahn, United States Environmental Policy: Past,Present,and Future,34
Nat. Resources J.347 (1994).
43. See id. at 325.
44. See STEVN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INcENVES? 107-18 (1981).
45. See id.
46. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILUAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL DIRTY AnR 36-37 (1981).
47. See id.
48. See ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE 295-368 (1987).
49. See JAMES 14 RIDENOUR, THE NATIONAL PARKS COMPROMISED: PORK BARREL POLITICS
& AMERICA'S TREASURES 101-06 (1994).

50. Seeid.
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destructive to the cause they advocate.51 Lewis charges that many of these
groups have no grasp of the practical realities of representative government
or a free market economy, and apparently they consider occupation of the
moral high ground preferable to any attainment of their goals that requires
any compromise in their ideals.'
V. RESOURCE USER AND INDUSTRIAL INTEREST GROUPS
Resource user and industrial interest groups frequently oppose
Type II and Type III environmental protection policies. Applying Olson's
theory to their normal organizational patterns, one can predict that in
contrast with environmental groups, resource user and industrial groups
will often acquire resources from a large proportion of their prospective
membership. One reason for this is that the prospective members of these
groups typically share very specific, geographically localized, political
interests. The prospective membership of each group is often small,
sometimes consisting of no one other than the employees in a particular
factory, or a handful of ranchers sharing grazing rights on a tract of public
land.
These groups commonly exert coercive pressures on prospective
members, as well. Membership in resource user and industrial labor
unions, such as the United Mine Workers, is often a condition of employment. Other forms of resource user and industrial group coercion are more
subtle. For example, managers of resource user firms can divert company
revenues into government liaison operations, effectively forcing workers
and stockholders to contribute to user group lobbying. Another example
is collaborative marketing, transportation, storage, and water use within
agricultural cooperatives. Economic efficiencies can create powerful
incentives for farmers and ranchers to join these cooperatives, and the
cooperatives are often closely affiliated with user groups, making user
group membership a de facto requirement for entry into the cooperatives.
The prediction that resource user and industrial interest groups
will acquire resources from many of their prospective members has a
significant implication for environmental policy making. It indicates that
even though the environmental protection constituency may indude many
more voters than the resource user and industrial constituencies, the
balance of interest group power will not reflect these demographics
directly. Instead, this balance of group power will be relatively favorable
to resource users and to industry.

51. See LEwIs, supra note 13, at 242-51.
52. See id.
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VI. U.S. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: AN OVERVIEW
A key tenet of environmentalism is that everything is connected to
everything else.' Thus, environmentalists routinely contend that for
government to advance Type II and Type I environmental policy
objectives, it must have an encompassing vision of biological relationships
and ecological systems, implementing policies that conform to scientifically, rather than politically, established jurisdictions.' But federalism,
single member districts, the congressional committee system, and
bureaucratic decentralization fragment the vision of U.S. political institutions, and policy makers seldom, if ever, operate on the basis of a broad,
integrated perspective on any issue.5
The prevalence of "incrementalism" in U.S. policy making
exacerbates the effects of this institutional fragmentation.' Following the
incremental approach, policy makers contemplate policy change in a
sequence of limited deviations from the status quo, seldom if ever
thoroughly reconstituting policies. Thus, congressional committees and
agencies typically craft bits and pieces of policy independently, with little
regard for how the pieces fit together or whether broader goals are
advanced effectively."
The result of institutional fragmentation and incrementalism is an
environmentalist's nightmare, the antithesis of the "holistic" policy-making
approach that they advocate.'M Norman Vig and Michael Kraft conclude
"perhaps the greatest obstacle to more rational and effective environmental
policy making at present is absence of any mechanism for integrating and

53. See COMMONER, supra note 12.

54. See, e.g., COMMONER, supra note 12; OPHUL5, supra note 6; Lester R. Brown & Sandra
L.Postel, Sustainability in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: READINGS IN CONSERVATION
HISTORY, supra note 12, at 323; Don E.Marietta Jr., EnvironmentalHolism and Individuals, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHics: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE, supra note 12, at 405; John
Rodman, Ecological Sensibility, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE,
supra note 12, at 382; Naess, supra note 12, at 411-21; Foreman, supra note 19.
55. Specialists in environmental policy who make this argument include KRAFr, supra
note 27, at 50-66; ROSENBAUM, supra note 12, at 88-107. Some of the political scientists who
have evaluated the broader implications of US. institutional fragmentation include FIORINA,
supra note 6, at 56-81; Lowi (1964), supra note 6, at 677-715; MCCONNELL, supranote 6, at 33668; MAYHEW, supra note 6, at 81-180; ScHATrScHNEiDER, supra note 6, at 47-77; JAMES L.
SUNDQUIST, CONSTMIONAL REFORM AND EFFETI GOVERNMENT 1-87 (1992).
56. See KRAFT, supranote 27, at 52-53; ROSENBAUM, supra note 12, at 90-91; CHARLES L.
LDMLOM, THE PoucY MAKI PROCESS passim (1968).
57. See FIORINA, supra note 6, at 62-67; Lowl (1969), supra note 6, at 85-124; MCCONNELL,
supra note 6, at 336-68; DEAN E. MANN, ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY FORMATION passim (1981).
58. See OPHULS, supra note 6, at 188-98.
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coordinating
policy actions on the basis of an overall strategy or set of
priorities." '9
The political self-interest literature also argues that the decentralized organization of U.S. institutions inherently biases the system in favor
of narrow, specific benefit claims, such as those of most interest groups,
and against diffuse claims, such as those of the broad constituency favoring
environmental protection.' James Wilson has observed:
It is remarkable that policies [with diffuse benefits and
specific costs] are ever adopted, and in fact many are
not....
The framers arranged things.. .so that a determined
minority has an excellent chance of blocking a new policy....The opponent [of such a policy] has every incentive to
work hard; the large group of prospective beneficiaries may
be unconvinced of 61the benefit or regard it as too small to be
worth fighting for.
E. E. Schattschneider and Grant McConnell explain this argument more
fully. Borrowing liberally from James Madison's Federalist No. 10, they
contend that when a wide range of constituencies are represented within
a decision making system, special interests will likely come into conflict
with each other, resulting in a web of checks against the power of each
special interest. In contrast, within a fragmented decision making system,
only a narrow range of interests is represented within any particular
subunit. Thus, special interests will more often dominate within individual
subunits, much like big fish in small ponds.
McConnell adds to this thesis a spin especially pertinent to
environmental policy. He maintains that broad, diffuse interests can
aggregate power to an appreciable degree only in an open, publicly visible
decision making arena.' With their power aggregated, diffuse interests can
contend effectively with special interests. Fragmented decision making
systems; however, disaggregate the power of diffuse interests, forcing them
to fight many battles with special interests simultaneously, each within a
special interest "home court" arena that has essentially zero public
visibility.
Schattschneider and McConnell offer essentially the same remedy
to special interest domination in U.S. policy making. They think that

59. Michael E. Kraft & Norman J.
Vi& The New EnvironmentalAgenda, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY INTHE 1990s: REFORM OR REACON?, supra note 3, at 367.
60. See MAYHEW, supranote 6, passim; MCCONNELL, supra note 6; OPHIULS, supra note 6,
passim; SCHATrScHNEDR supra note 6, passim; and WILSON, supra note 8, at 436.
61. WILSON, supranote 8,at 436.
62. See MCCONNELL, supra note 6, at 363-68; SCHATSCHNEER, supra note 6, at 47-61.

63.

See MCCONNELL, supranote 6, at 91-118.
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diffuse interests are best served when specific policy decisions are ironed
out as a part of a publicly visible interplay between the political parties or
other broad coalitions." This article will return to this theme in sections DC
and X, below.
VII. CONGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
ENVIRONMENTAL PORK BARRELING
Like the self-interest literature on voting and interest groups, the
congressional self-interest literature seldom deals explicitly with environmental policy. But here also, one can readily derive from existing theory
predictions pertinent to environmental policy making.
One highly influential exploration of congressional self-interest is
David Mayhew's Congress:The ElectoralConnection.6' Mayhew argues that
even though congressmembers may have diverse personal goals, advancing these goals ultimately depends on winning reelection.6 According to
Mayhew, one key to congressional reelection is "credit claiming. " 'b Credit
claiming is the process of persuading a voter that you, personally, as their
representative, have done something to improve the voter's welfare. Within
a single member district system, congressmembers can claim credit most
readily by delivering "particularized" benefits to their constituents.
Mayhew defines particularized benefits as those (1) allocated specifically
to an individual, group, or geographic area; or (2) allocated in a manner
that highlights the representative's instrumental role in securing the
benefit.0
Many particularized benefits would be described conventionally
as pork barrel projects-highways, dams, weapons contracts, veterans
hospitals, grants to local government, and the like. Although budgetary
and other constraints have reduced the prevalence of traditional pork
barreling over the past 20 years, the political incentives remain, and public
policies often manifest imaginative responses to these incentives. 9
In application to environmental policies, Mayhew's argument
implies that congressmembers stand to gain the most politically from Type
I policies, with specific and tangible benefits. The lower information costs

64. See id. at 102-07; SCHATScHNE!D,
65.

supra note 6, at 1-13.

MAYHEW, supra note 6.

66. See id. at 14-18.
67. See id. at 52-61,
68. See id. at 54.
69. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON, &WALTERJ.OLES,

CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 180-81 (5th
ed. 1996). One spectacular example of such unconventional pork barreling was the industry

specific "transition rules" contained in the 1986 tax reform law. See JEFEY H. BIRNBAUM &
ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH 240-43 (1987).
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associated with comprehending specific and tangible benefits should
reinforce the incentives Mayhew describes. So too should the distribution
of interest group power in environmental policy, as resource user and
industrial groups, far more commonly than environmental groups, seek
particularized benefits.
Unquestionably, the natural resource development policies of
nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth centuries trafficked extensively in
Type I, particularized benefits7 For example:
1. Reciprocity between Congress and water resource agencies
such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers
made federal water projects the textbook case study of pork
barrel politics from the 1930s through the 1970s.'
2. Policies regulating mining parceled out highly profitable
ownership claims, leases, and extraction rights, often creating
local economic booms, while externalizing a variety of environmental problems, and yielding below market rates of return for
the landowning public.'
3. Forest Service road construction and below cost timber sales
have long delivered the particularized benefit of logging
industry jobs to key congressional districts.7s
The incentive to particularize benefits also appears to leave an
imprint on many modem policies originally conceived, or at least
rationalized, as "environmental protection." "Environmental protection"
measures that appear to supply Type I, particularized benefits on a
significant scale include the following:
1. The municipal sewage waste treatment program first authorized in 1956 and expanded by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972. Construction grants to localities were by
a wide margin the most expensive item in the entire federal
environmental protection budget through the 1970s and 1980s,
accounting for about $50 billion in federal expenditure in
addition to about $25 billion in matching state and local

20-43 (1983); KRAFr, supra
70. See, e.g., MAION CLAWsON, THE FEDERAL LANES v
note 27, at 67-68; MCCONNELU, supra note 6, at 196-245; CONG. Q., INc., THE BATTLE FOR
NATURAL RrsouRcEs 131-81 (1983).
71. An extensive, though perhaps not entirely objective, history of water project pork
barreling and its destructive consequences for the environment appears in MARK REISR,
CADL Ac DEsERT (1986).

Q., INc., supa note 70, at 79-100,171-182.

72.

See CLAwSON, supra note 70, at 84-98; CON.

73.

See CONG. Q., INC, supranote 70, at 136-153.
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funds74 Data from 1978 to 1987 indicate minimal improvement
in water quality under the Act.
2. The clean air legislation of 1977 and 1990, which resulted in
billions of particularized benefits to the smokestack scrubber
industry, ethanol producers, and West Virginia coal miners 76
By some estimates, the costs of the 1990 legislation will prove
to be more than double the benefits."
3. The toxic waste Superfund, which has yet to result in the clean
up of many waste sites, but which has created an economic
boom in the waste treatment industry.'
4. The congressional expansion of the U.S. National Park system
into 374 separate administrative units. Former park service
director James M. Ridenour decried this expansion of the park
system as "park barrel" politics that established a "park of the
month" in the 1970s.Y
VIII.

CONGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
POLICY SYMBOLISM

Though environmental pork barreling may help individual
congressmembers to capture resource user and industrial group support
and to win other votes with local, tangible economic benefits, it offers little
to the broad, largely uninformed, public constituency favoring the concept
of environmental protection. A substantial political science literature
explores how politicians contend with constituencies of this type. This
literature concludes that because otherwise uninformed voters sometimes
do become selectively informed, congressmembers generally do give some

74. See FIELD, supra note 3, at 282; ROSENBAUM, supranote 12, at 220.
75. See Hahn, supra note 42, at 312-13.
76. See AcKERMAN & HASSLER, supranote 46, at 44-54; Jonathan H. Alder, Clean Fuels,
DirtyAir, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLMCs, PUuc COS7S, PRIVATE REWARDS 19,39-41 (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L.Smith eds., 1992); GARY C. BRYNER, BLuE SKIES GREEN PoLmCs 146-51,199204(1995).
77. See Hahn, supra note 42, at 321.
78. See ROSDNAUM, sra note 40, at 231-33; Marc K Landry &Mary Hague, The Coalition
for Waste: Private Interests and the Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLImcS, PUBuC ComTs,
PRIVATE REWARDS, supra note 76, at 67-81; ROsENBAUM, supranote 12, at 253.
79. Often opposed by the National Park Service itself, this expansion so diluted the Park
Service budget that a backlog of at least $2-3 billion in unfunded maintenance projects had
accumulated by 1992. See RIDENOUR, supra note 49, at 16-19, 107.
80. See id.
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weight to the views that such voters would have if they were to become
informed.' Thus, they do try to compile voting records that are generally
acceptable to such voters.
Drawing upon Gordon Tullock and Murray Edelman, Mayhew
argues that maintaining a record acceptable to the public does not require
congressmembers to sacrifice the prerogatives of interest groups m Instead,
capitalizing on the limited attention span of most voters; and on institutional arrangements that muddle the relationship between decisions, costs,
and benefits; congressmembers can demonstrate concern for the public by
engaging in policy symbolism. Mayhew identifies two basic forms of policy
symbolism: (1) statements of sentiment, such as congressional resolutions,
that have no legal policy effect, and; (2) decisions which legally establish
real policy objectives, and which potentially could have effects, but which
have been designed not to achieve their objectives.'
Mayhew's second form of symbolism appears commonly in
"public interest" regulatory law, especially when advancing the public
interest has specific costs." Congress can program such policies to fail in
a variety of ways. Frequently, the objectives of the policies are unrealistic,
or so ambiguous that they can be interpreted to mean almost anything.
Commonly, Congress fails to create the means or to provide the funds
needed to attain the policy objectives.' Sometimes, Congress knows the

81. For example, when information is essentially costless to voters, such as the
information contained in entertaining advertisements produced by a political opponent,
voters could become selectively informed. For analysis of how much congressmembers
concern themselves with politically inattentive voters, see ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 3-13; G.
JACOBSON, THE POLncs OF CoNGREssioNAL ELEnoNs 106-16,185-95 (4th ed. 1997); JOHN W.
KiNGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DeCIoINS 29-68 (2nd ed. 1981); W. Miller & D. Stokes,
Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POL Scmc REv. 45 (1963). For a dissenting opinion
from a political scientist who thinks that politicians almost entirely discount uninformed
voters, see BERNSTEIN, supranote 24.
82. SeeMAYHEW, supra note 6, at 132-40. Similar arguments appear in MURRAY EDELMAN,

THE SYMsOuC UsEs OF PoUTIcs (1964).
83. See MAYHEW, supra note 6, at 132. In a 1997 interview, Pennsylvania Governor Tom
Ridge observed that one difference between being a governor and being a US. Representative
was that "Never in my 12 years in Congress...was I terribly worried about how [a
congressional action] would be carried out." Jack C. Germond &Jules Witcover, FindGOP's
PracticalLeaders in Statehouses,Not Congress, SALT LAKE TRn., Apr. 7,1997, at A9.
84. See EDELMAN, supra note 82, at 22-29; MAYHEW, supra note 6, at 135.
85. ROSENBAUM, supra note 40, has detailed the relationship between congressional
mandates and the implementation of environmental regulations by the EPA. Although he
finds the relationship to be complex, with at least some congress members sincerely
supporting vigorous regulation, he hypothesizes that "a major source of regulatory failure in
the EPA is a chronic insufficiency of financial and personnel resources." Rosenbaum, supra
note 40, at 235.
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bureaucracy will be reluctant to enforce the policy, and it passes the law
anticipating that enforcement will be spotty and easily circumvented."
Because they are designed to provide diffuse and intangible
benefits that are difficult to measure and involve many scientific uncertainties, Type II and Type IMI policies would appear to be especially good
candidates for symbolic formulation. A short list of Type II and Type M
policies that seem to contain significant measures of symbolism would
include the following:
1. The 1970 Clean Air Amendments, which almost laughably
required a 90 percent reduction in key automotive pollutants
by 1976, and theoretically threatened polluters with $25,000
daily fines for noncompliance.'
2. The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which essentially promised the elimination of all water pollution by 1985.'

3. The 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, which created the
almost powerless Council on Environmental Quality and
which committed the government "to use all practical means
and measures...to create and maintain the conditions under
which man and nature can coexist in harmony. ""
Another form of environmental policy symbolism can be characterized as "policy layering."' Exceedingly common in federal land management, policy layering involves the creation of new policy objectives
contradictory to existing policies. When policies are layered, the preexisting
policy, which typically allocates benefits to a resource user or industrial
interest group, undermines implementation of the new policy, rendering
it largely ineffectual and symbolic. Some apparent examples of environmental policy layering are as follows:

86. Fiorina carries this line of argument one step further. He speculates that Congress
may deliberately establish infeasible policy objectives and otherwise write laws that are
intrinsically impossible to implement so that the bureaucracy will become a scapegoat for the
failures of government. See FIORINA, supra note 6, at 72-79.
87. See WALTERA. ROSENBAUM, THE PoLTms oFENvuKRmEWFALCONCERN 145 (2nd ed.
1977).
88. See id. at 158.
89. Id. at 118.
90. Mayhew does not use the term "layering," or present the concept exactly as I have
here, but he does note that contradictions between the goals of policies can reduce policies to
symbolism, and he refers to water pollution control as an example. See MAYHEW, supra note
6, at 134-35.
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1. The Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976. This law,
and others like it, proved to have little effect on land management practices usually beneficial to resource user groups."
2. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, which on the
surface required the Forest Service to consider land uses other
than logging in its management decisions. According to Robert
Nelson, however, the actual effect of the Act was to give the
Forest Service wide management latitude, while also reducing
the political pressure to transfer Forest Service lands to the
more preservationist jurisdiction of the National Park Service.n
3. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, which has forced the Fish
and Wildlife Service to contend with countless government
programs destructive to endangered wildlife habitat, and
which Congress has underfunded so seriously that recovery
plans have been implemented for only a handful of species."
4. Wilderness designations under the 1964 Wilderness Act, which
ordinarily do not interfere with established grazing rights,
mining claims, or predator control practices, and which
sometimes preserve water diversions."
Ordinarily, one would not expect that such policy symbolism
would satisfy the policy demands of politically attentive voters, such as
most interest group members. But if, as predicted, many environmental
interest group members are idealistic ideologues, then it stands to reason
that they would demand idealistic, ideological policies-policies that set
moralistic, perhaps utopian goals, and that promise to attain the goals
regardless of cost. Congress obviously cannot produce realistic policies that
satisfy these criteria, but policy symbolism can.

91. ROaERT H. NELSON, Pusuc LANmI AND PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE FAILURE OF ScENTmc
MANAGEMENT 67-84,170,228-34 (1995); ROSENBAUM, supra note 12, at 301-28.
92. See NELSON, supranote 91, at 67-71.
93. See ROSENEAUM, supra note 12, at 333-39.

94. See Nelson, supranote 91, at 72-73. With years of experience at the epicenter of one
of the nation's most explosive wilderness controversies, former Utah Natural Resource
Executive Director Ted Stewart confirmed that all preexisting mining claims, virtually all

predator control practices, and many preexisting water diversions are left untouched by
wilderness designations. He also commented that "wilderness designations are largely
symbolic-there are far more effective ways of protecting the land." Interview with Ted
Stewart, former Utah Natural Resource Executive Director, in Logan, Utah (Apr. 16,1997).
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IX. CONGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ADVANCING
THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC CONSTITUENCY
An emerging literature produced by Douglas Arnold and other
scholars argues that political circumstances can make it possible for
congressmembers to advance their self-interest by providing real,
nonsymbolic policy benefits to broad, largely uninformed constituencies,
such as the public constituency for environmental protection. 5 Agreeing
that many of Mayhew's predictions have general validity, Arnold
nonetheless finds many exceptions-cases in which the normally uninformed public did prevail in a policy conflict with organized interest
groups." According to Arnold, these exceptions can arise when two
conditions are met: (1) a policy provides salient benefits to a substantial
number of individuals, and; (2) skilled, committed congressional leaders
make the decision visible and important to otherwise inattentive voters, so
that congressmembers who support the policy receive electoral rewards.'
Wilson's and Kraft's analyses run closely parallel to Arnold's and
overlap the arguments made by Schattschneider and McConnelL Wilson
and Kraft particularly stress the visibility of issues, and the dedicated
leadership by "policy entrepreneurs.' In environmental policy, Kraft and
Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer specifically attribute the enactment of pioneering environmental laws in the 1970s to the policy entrepreneurship of
Senator Edmund Muskie." In their study of the 1986 tax reform law,
Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam develop
similar themes." They also highlight President Reagan's resolute
leadership and mobilization of public support as integral to the passage of
the bill. 1 Their line of argument-that presidential leadership can give
congressmembers greater incentive to concern themselves with broad,
normally uninformed constituencies-also finds support in presidential
political self-interest theory.

95. See ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 68-67; TIMOTHYJ. CONLAN ST AL, TAXING CHOICES: THE
POLIICS OF TAX REFORM (1990); WILSON, supra note 8, at 437; and Michael E. Kraft, Congress
and EnvironmentalPolicy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POIrTICS AND POuCY, supra note 12, at 177-78.
96. See ARNOLD, supranote 6, at 119-261.
97. See id.
98. See WILSON, supra note 8, at 437; Kraft, supra note 95, at 177-78.
99. See Kraft, supra note 95, at 172; JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICS: DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 14,58 (1994).
100. See CONLAN E AL, supra note 95, at 230-60.

101. See id. at 236-39.
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X. THE PRESIDENCY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Although very little of the literature on the institution explicitly
employs any type of self-interest approach, Garry Miller's pioneering
application of public choice theory to the presidency deserves serious
consideration in relation to environmental protection." z Citing
Schattschneider, Miller agrees that the scope of participation in a policy
conflict determines the power balance between participants."' Miller also
agrees with Mayhew that normally within the Congress, the rational
inattentiveness of most voters enables interest groups to limit the scope of
political conflict, and to dictate policy outcomes.'' To advance the interests
of the general public, the scope of conflict must be expanded, and the
public must be activated.'0
To activate the public, the costs of being informed about an issue
must be reduced to the point that they are "dose to zero or negative.""0 '
Examples of political information obtained at little or negative cost include
newspaper headlines glanced upon while in search of the sports section
and jokes about politicians told by late night talk show hosts.
Miller believes that the president is uniquely positioned within our
political system to dominate the flow of inexpensive political
information. 107 Using the symbolism of the office and other communications resources, he or she can make issues salient to diffuse constituencies
as no other office holder can."0 ' Applied to environmental policy, Miller's
argument implies that the presidential mobilization of public support can
radically improve the prospects for the approval of policies with diffuse or
intangible benefits. It suggests that environmentalists should look to the
president for entrepreneurial policy leadership.
Bill Clinton has demonstrated how a president can thrust the
environment into prominence on the national political agenda. One
conspicuous example was Clinton's September 1996 announcement that he
had used his discretionary authority under the 1906 Antiquities Act to
establish the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah.
Staging this announcement on the North Rim of Grand Canyon National

Park, he capitalized on the telegenic dimensions of environmental

102. See Miller, supra note 6.
103. See id. at 289.
104. See id. at 293-96.
105. See id. at 303-10.
106. See id. at 304. Information obtained at "negative cost" is information that provides
benefits, such as entertainment, that exceed the costs of acquiring the information.
107. See id. at 311-14.
108. See id.
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protection, and the announcement was treated as one of the major stories
of the day by the national media.
Republicans complained that Clinton's announcement was a
transparently political attempt to win votes in the 1996 election.1" Given
the timing of the announcement, these complaints probably had some
validity. Both the announcement and the Republican reaction to it should,
however, hearten environmentalists. These events suggest that both
President Clinton and the Republicans perceive that environmental
protection can be good politics." 0 Such environmental protection in the
service of political self-interest probably causes discomfort to some within
the movement. But political self-interest also creates opportunities for the
movement, and the movement should consider how these opportunities
might be utilized most effectively.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The theory assembled here does not ring with optimism about the
prospects for the enactment of scientifically sound and economically
efficient environmental policies by U.S. political institutions. Nor does it
indicate that the advocacy of such policies is a lost cause. It does suggest
that environmental protection in the United States will continue to be an
uphill climb.
The theory predicts that despite the impressive level of public
support for the concept of environmental protection, the power to shape
environmental policy will reside largely with well organized resource user
and industrial groups on one side, and idealistic, sometimes uncompromising environmental groups on the other. The theory further predicts that as
it tries to please everyone and to win reelection in the process, Congress
will readily approve broadly popular "environmental protection" statutes,
but once implemented into policy, the statutes will often prove to be broken
promises. Sometimes the policies will amount to little but pork barrel
politics. Sometimes they will prove to be hollow, symbolic statements
unsupported by fiscal or bureaucratic resources. Sometimes they will
conflict fundamentally with the established prerogatives of resource user
or industrial groups, and have little effect on the actual operation of

109. See Dan Harrie, GOP Says Monument Will Doom Orton, SALT LAKE TR1B., Sept. 26,1996,
at C1.
110. Clinton advisor James Carville has concluded from survey data that the environment
was one of two issues that worked most to the president's advantage in the 1996 election, The
other issue Carville mentioned was education policy. James Carville, Address at Utah State
Univ., Dec. 4,1997.
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government. Seldom, if ever, will congressional committees and agencies
coordinate their decisions to respond to problems in a broad context.
This analysis has several important implications for environmental
interest group political strategy. It cautions the groups to resist the allure
of policy symbolism. It commends the groups to raise the public visibility
of specific environmental policy conflicts, and to convince otherwise
inattentive voters of what these voters stand to gain tangibly from
environmental protection, so that environmental protection has an electoral
payoff for politicians."' It advises them that as policy advocates they must
be mindful of voter information costs, remembering that simplicity can be
a supreme political virtue, and that one good television image can be worth
more than a thousand words of hearings testimony.
The theory presented here also tells environmentalists that U.S.
institutions are likely to be more hospitable to the advancement of certain
types of environmental policy objectives than to the advancement of others.
The best prospects exist when a policy provides tangible benefits, or
benefits that can be made to appear tangible. Thus, theory suggests that
environmentalists should couple efforts to provide diffuse, intangible
benefits to programs with specific and tangible benefits such as recreational
opportunities and jobs in the environmental protection industry."2
The national park system illustrates both the upside and the
downside to this approach. As discussed, the park system does appear to
many to be an environmental pork barrel that exists primarily to put
natural wonders on display for hordes of tourists, boosting local economies. Because there are so many parks and they must accommodate so
many visitors, the parks do not promote environmental values efficiently.
At best, the more popular parks are ecologically blemished, and in the
worst cases such as Yellowstone, political pressures on management have
resulted in ecological travesties." 3 Yet, despite its flaws, the park system
does provide many diffuse environmental benefits. It preserves vast
acreages of wilderness and old growth forests, and hundreds of miles of
wild rivers and undeveloped coastlines. It also offers refuge to large
populations of valuable, and sometimes rare, animal and plant species.
Thus, the Park Service compromises environmental ideals, but it furthers

111. Note that raising the public visibility of a particular issue is something quite different
from raising public "consciousness" about the environment generally.
112. "Ecotourism" has become integral to economic growth in several less developed
nations, and although controversial, the ecotourism industry has become a powerful advocate
of environmental protection in some of these nations. See Steven Parker, The Role of Public
Policy in the Management of Ecotourism:A ComparativePerspective,presented at the Western
Social Science Association Meetings, Albuquerque, N.M., 1997 (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
113. See Chase, supra note 26.
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them as well In many situations, such compromise may be the only
realistic alternative to no environmental protection at all.
Finally, the theory presented here suggests that the many
environmentalists who reflexively manifest a preference for decentralized
institutions may be strategically misguided.1 4 Like any other special
interest group, environmentalists can readily dominate within particular
congressional subcommittees, federal agencies, or environmentally
oriented communities such as Boulder, Colorado. But such domination
may give environmentalists an exaggerated sense of their own importance
within the larger scheme of things; it may create illusions of environmental
grandeur. Rather than advocating that people "think globally and act
locally," perhaps environmentalists should advocate that people "think
politically and act nationally." Environmentalists may best be able to
preserve their ideals within fragmented policy making units, but to advance
their ideals they need to contend with the larger political forces that shape
incentives for office holders.

114. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 82-116.

